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Abstract
We study strategic information transmission in a Sender-Receiver game where play-
ers’ optimal actions depend on the realization of multiple signals but the players dis-
agree on the relative importance of each piece of news. We characterize a statistical
environment - featuring symmetric loss functions and elliptically distributed param-
eters - in which the Sender’s expected utility depends only on the first moment of
his posterior. Despite disagreement about the use of underlying signals, we demon-
strate the existence of equilibria in differentiable strategies in which the Sender can
credibly communicate posterior means. The existence of smooth communication equi-
libria depends on the relative usefulness of the signal structure to Sender and Receiver,
respectively. We characterize extensive forms in which the quality of information is
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optimally designed of equal importance to Sender and Receiver so that the best equi-
librium in terms of ex ante expected payoffs is a smooth communication equilibrium.
The quality of smooth equilibrium communication is entirely determined by the corre-
lation of interests. Senders with better aligned preferences are endogenously endowed
with better information and therefore give more accurate advice.
JEL: D82
Keywords: strategic information transmission, multi-dimensional cheap talk, monotone
strategies, endogenous information, elliptical distributions
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
This paper studies strategic communication when a Sender and a Receiver agree on the
important determinants of optimal decisions but disagree on the relative importance of sev-
eral arguments. We term this relative (dis-)agreement and show that blindly following a
Sender’s recommendations may be perfectly consistent with equilibrium behavior despite
such disagreement.
For concreteness, imagine a politician who needs to decide whether and by how much
she should raise taxes. Envision further that she would like to take her decision taking
into account information about the cost of sovereign debt and the impact of a tax raise
on employment, so she seeks advice from an expert. The expert’s preferences are broadly
aligned with those of the politician: he dislikes higher sovereign debt, but less so if interest
rates remain low, and he dislikes increases in the unemployment rate. However, the relative
importance the advisor attaches to these issues differs from the relative importance attached
to them by the politician. The expert needs to investigate the matter before he can give an
informed answer. Moreover, he can direct his investigations and so chooses to get more or
less precise information about this or the other issue. The politician is free to use the advice
in any way she sees fit - she cannot commit on how to use the expert’s advice up-front. Her
only influence on the quality of advice is through a careful selection of her advisor.
This is a natural situation of strategic communication with several differences to the
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one analyzed in Crawford & Sobel (1982). There are several pieces of information - more
precisely, signals - that should go into the politician’s and the expert’s ideal choice. The
politician and the expert disagree about the aggregation of the signals into a choice. Since
both of them care only about a unidimensional decision that is taken, the conflict is ultimately
unidimensional, despite information being higher dimensional. The way politician and expert
disagree about the choice depends in non-trivial ways on the relative precision of the signals
the expert gathers. If the expert’s signals are relatively more (less) precise on the issues that
are of primary interest to him, then the politician reacts conservatively (progressively) to the
expert’s advice, following his suggestions less (more) than one for one. However, provided
the advisor chooses the relative precisions of the signals he observes the right way, then it
becomes possible that the politician can take the advisor’s recommendation at face value
despite the fact that they disagree on the aggregation of individual pieces of information.
Put differently, the politician can follow the advisor’s conclusions blindly, although it remains
pointless to ask the advisor for the reasons behind his conclusions, that is, the underlying
signals he observed. Even though the last situation seems to be as knife edge as it gets, it is
precisely the situation that arises if the politician selects the best advisor she can get.
In a nut shell, the politician should carefully choose her advisor, delegate investigating
matters to the advisor, and then ask the advisor to state conclusions, skipping the details.
On top of saving time, conclusions can be communicated without conflict, while justifications
for them cannot.
Relative (dis-)agreement is common in practice. Think of a CEO hiring a personal
assistant whom she plans to consult on important matters. Even if the CEO manages to
select an assistant with whom she perfectly agrees for now, it is not to be expected that
they will have perfectly aligned interests on all matters that will come up in the future.
Suppose again that they disagree on the relative importance of several arguments shaping
decisions. Suppose that the assistant does not care about such decisions per se, but starts
to care only if he puts skin into the game, i.e., when he is hired. The CEO can pay the
assistant up front to convince him to work for her. Moreover, the CEO can fine-tune the
working conditions of her assistant in quite some detail so that she can effectively control the
quality of the information that the assistant gets. However, due to time constraints the CEO
cannot observe the signal realizations directly, and therefore needs the assistant to observe
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and communicate them to the CEO who then takes a decision.
The difference to the former situation is that the quality of information is controlled
by the advisee (the CEO) rather than the advisor, as in the politician’s problem. This is
reminiscent of a disclosure or a persuasion game rather than an advisor controlled information
acquisition story. However, in common with the first situation, the CEO optimally endows
the assistant with information that makes his conclusions equally useful to both of them.
Doing so ensures that the CEO can again blindly follow the assistant’s advice and so selects
the optimal communication procedure that maximizes the ex ante expected surplus.
1.2 Setup
The following model of strategic information transmission in the tradition of Crawford &
Sobel (1982) gives rise to these insights. A Sender communicates with a Receiver before the
latter takes a decision that affects both their utilities. The Sender and the Receiver prefer
different decisions to be taken in almost every state of the world. We depart from Crawford
& Sobel (1982) in that we assume that the Sender and the Receiver are both uncertain about
their ideal policy: each player’s ideal choice is equal to the realization of a random variable1.
The conflict between the players is described by a joint distribution over the two-dimensional
state. The Sender gets to observe a two-dimensional signal about the underlying state of the
world and then communicates with the Receiver who finally takes an action. We exploit the
advantages of elliptical distributions to give tractability to our model. Within this statistical
class and for symmetric loss functions, the players would ideally want to choose an action
that corresponds to the conditionally expected value of the random variable that describes
their ideal choice - “their state” - given the information. Moreover, for the elliptical class,
conditional means are linear functions of the signals. This allows to give a precise meaning to
the direction and strength of influence of each given signal on the Sender’s and the Receiver’s
ideal choice. The interesting case corresponds to one where the conditional expectations of
both players (about their states, respectively) are increasing in both signals but each one
of them has a signal that is of primary importance to him/her. In that case, we can talk
about relative (dis-)agreement: they agree on the direction of influence of the signal but they
disagree on how strongly the signal should affect the choice.
1In modern tongue, the bias is state dependent in our model.
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Since information is two-dimensional and there is only one unidimensional choice to make,
the model exhibits a natural source of pooling: the Sender’s conditionally expected utility
depends only on the posterior mean, so Sender types who have observed different signal
realizations giving rise to the same conditional mean pool on the same message. This is both
similar and strikingly different from the partial pooling we know from Crawford & Sobel
(1982). It is similar in that the underlying Sender type is only partially revealed. However,
it is completely different in that the resulting equilibrium is not described by an interval
partition of the state space. In contrast, it is possible that the Sender honestly reveals his
conditional mean and the Receiver rightly takes this message at face value. That is, both
the Sender’s message strategy and the Receiver’s action strategy are strictly monotonic and
differentiable functions of the players’ information. In fact, the strategies are linear. It must
be stressed that this equilibrium exists despite conflicts of interest, that is despite the Sender
and the Receiver disagreeing on how to map signals into choices.
We term equilibria in strictly monotonic and differentiable strategies smooth communica-
tion equilibria. The existence of smooth communication equilibria depends crucially on the
quality of information that the Sender gets to observe. In particular, smooth communication
requires that the Sender’s conditionally optimal choice correlates the same way with both
the Sender’s and the Receiver’s underlying state. Only in this case will the Receiver - who
couldn’t care less about what is good for the Sender - do exactly what she is told; this is be-
cause the conditionally optimal choice of the Receiver conditional on observing the Sender’s
conditionally optimal choice is identically equal to the latter for an information structure
that is equally useful to both Sender and Receiver in the described way. For information
structures that fail to satisfy this requirement, equilibrium communication is partitional,
exactly the way we know it from the existing theories.
While theoretically interesting, why should smooth communication be of any practical
relevance? Information structures that induce smooth communication are optimal in var-
ious extensive forms. The intuition for this result is a simple efficiency argument. E.g.,
information structures that induce smooth communication arise naturally in a symmetric
environment when the player in charge of shaping the environment cares about joint sur-
plus. Think of a situation as in the CEO/personal assistant example, where the CEO-receiver
needs to pay the assistant-sender to convince him to participate and suppose both the assis-
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tant and the CEO have quasilinear utility. However, payments cannot condition on advice
nor on outcomes nor on both. In such a world, the CEO’s payoff is equal to the sum of both
players’ utilities from decision making. Now suppose the CEO can control the precision of
the information the assistant obtains without getting to observe the actual realizations of
the signals. Then, the CEO chooses an information structure that maximizes expected joint
surplus, resulting precisely in an information structure that is equally useful to the assistant
and the CEO. Hence, in this environment, smooth communication is the best equilibrium in
terms of ex ante expected surplus.
Envision another situation like the one in the politician’s and advisor’s case where the
politician-receiver has less of an influence on the information that the advisor-sender ob-
serves. Imagine that the politician can only choose an advisor type. An advisor type is a
joint distribution over the players’ interests based on the information available at the start
of the game. Such information could, e.g., be observable through publicly observable infor-
mation about advisors or through their cv’s and the like. Once an advisor has been selected,
it is the advisor who has the right to choose the relative precision of signals, so the advisor
controls the quality of the information. Clearly, each player has an interest to get infor-
mation that correlates better with his/her underlying interests. However, a novel feature
of our model is that the nature of conflict between advisor and politician depends on the
quality of information. Moreover, the potential conflicts arising in communicating with an
advisor depend on that advisor’s type. When selecting a given type of advisor, the politician
anticipates that this advisor will choose the information that serves him best. We show
that the optimally selected advisor indeed chooses information that is equally useful to both
the advisor and the politician and thus is one with whom the politician can communicate
smoothly.
Smooth communication equilibria are easily tractable and thus lend themselves to com-
parative statics exercises. Sender types with better aligned interests end up being more com-
petent, give more accurate advice, and thus induce a higher volatility of Receiver choices.
However, the logic is subtly different from other approaches. In our model, Senders with
better aligned interests are endogenously endowed with better information and are therefore
rightly perceived as more competent. The loss of information through communication is
the smaller the better interests are aligned and completely vanishes if ex ante interests are
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perfectly correlated.
1.3 Literature
We build on a vast literature on communication and information beginning with Crawford
& Sobel (1982). We have already described the essential ways in which our approach differs
from theirs. The state in our model is a two-dimensional vector and so there is a state
dependent bias in our model. Moreover, the state remains uncertain, so the bias is not
perfectly known. Moreover, information is endogenous through the signals the Sender gets
to observe.
It is clearly crucial that information is two-dimensional; with one piece of information
only, smooth communication equilibria exist only in the trivial case of completely aligned
interests. We are not aware of any model featuring two-dimensional information and a one-
dimensional choice. Battaglini (2002) studies a model with a two-dimensional state and two
signals where the Receiver can perfectly extract all information. Meyer et al. (2013) study
the multidimensional cheap talk problem for the case where there are exogenous restrictions
on the feasible set of policies for the Receiver. The essential differences between these
approaches and ours are that the choice is two-dimensional and that there are two Senders
in these models. Having one Sender only and a one-dimensional choice makes it impossible
to extract all information in our model. In contrast, equilibrium communication is one-
dimensional and therefore involves some pooling by design of the model. Chakraborty &
Harbaugh (2007) and Chakraborty & Harbaugh (2010) study comparative cheap talk where
again both information and choices are at least two-dimensional. They show that the Sender
can always communicate comparative statements - e.g., that one state is larger than the other.
Our communication is not comparative. We derive a one-dimensional statistic as an upper
bound on what can be communicated in any equilibrium in our model. The essential reason
is that the dimension of choice is smaller than the dimension of information. Levy & Razin
(2007) study multi-dimensional cheap talk. However, the Sender has perfect information in
their paper and the dimension of choice equals the dimension of information.
Noise is an important element in our theory. Blume et al. (2007) have shown that noise
in communication may improve upon equilibrium communication. We share that conclu-
sion, for different reasons, however. In Blume et al. (2007), the Sender’s information gets
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destroyed with some probability making the Sender more willing to share his information.
In contrast, no noise is added to the Sender’s message here but the Sender does not have
perfect information to begin with. Noisy information is also present in Moscarini (2007)
who studies competence in a model of central bank communication. Information is both
unidimensional and exogenously given in that approach. Improving information has similar
comparative statics effects in both Moscarini (2007) and the present approach.
The optimal design of information structures prior to communication is another impor-
tant building block of our model. As we show in an extension to our main results in Theorem
2, if other information structures are selected in the first stage, then we are back in the case
of partitional equilibria, as the known models feature them. There are at least two distinct
approaches to endogenous information structures and we relate to both of them. In the
CEO story above, the Receiver controls the quality of information that the Sender observes.
Ivanov (2010) has first studied this in the strategic communication game and termed it “in-
formational control”. The optimal information structure in Ivanov (2010) remains partitional
so perfect communication is impossible. Gentzkow & Kamenica (2011) analyze a model of
Bayesian persuasion, where a Sender chooses the optimal information to provide a Receiver
with, knowing that the Receiver chooses an action that affects both their payoffs. The key
difference to our approach is the lack of commitment about messages that the Sender sends
to the Receiver in our approach. In Gentzkow & Kamenica (2011), signals are more or
less informative but always truthful. In contrast, in our model, for any given information
structure, the Sender can decide to transmit any message to the Receiver, so information
transmission is strategic as in Crawford & Sobel (1982). As a result, the precision of infor-
mation that reaches the Receiver depends both on the quality of information that the Sender
obtains and on the amount of information that the Sender transmits. The latter effect is
absent in Gentzkow & Kamenica (2011). Moreover, we show that the Sender’s willingness
to transmit information depends crucially on the information that the Sender observes.2
The second way in which endogenous information has been addressed is through informa-
2The idea of endowing agents in a game with information without the principal necessarily obtaining the
same information has been studied extensively in the context of auctions: see, e.g., Eso˝ & Szentes (2007),
Bergemann & Pesendorfer (2007) and Ganuza & Penalva (2010). The common idea in these papers is that
the principal (auctioneer) controls the precision of the agents’ information but does not get to observe the
signals the agents receive.
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tion acquisition by the Sender. Szalay (2005) studies the case of aligned ex post preferences
with commitment to decision rules; Eso˝ and Szalay (in preparation) study the same model
without commitment to decision rules. Argenziano et al. (2013) look at endogenous in-
formation in the case of a Sender who is uniformly biased in one direction; Di Pei (2013)
studies a model where the Sender can choose the partitional information that he observes.
With a biased Sender, the equilibrium remains partitional. This perspective relates to our
politician/advisor example. To isolate the purely strategic effects of different information
structures, we assume here that all information structures are equally costly. Extensions to
other cases are pursued in companion work.
Our model features conflicts whose nature depends on the quality of information. This is
to the best of our knowledge new in the literature. However, there are some approaches that
look at state dependent biases where for some states of the world, the Sender’s preferred
action is larger than the Receiver’s preferred action while the reverse is true for other states.
Such models are studied, e.g., by Stein (1989), Ottaviani & Sørensen (2006a), Ottaviani
& Sørensen (2006b), Alonso et al. (2008), and more recently by Gordon (2010). Smooth
communication equilibria do not exist in these setups, but equilibria inducing a countable
infinity of Receiver actions do. Equilibria with invertible strategies in communication models
have been studied in Kartik (2009), Kartik et al. (2007), and Austen-Smith & Banks (2000).
The former papers involve lying costs, the latter one money-burning. We do not rely on costs
of communication to obtain equilibria in invertible strategies. Li & Madara´sz (2008) show
that a Sender of unknown bias may be willing to communicate honestly if the distribution
of his bias is symmetric around zero. This is similar in our context. However, our statistical
model is very different from theirs and novel to the literature on strategic communication.
We relate the conflicts in the communication game to the quality of endogenous information
structures and show that a symmetrically distributed bias arises as an optimum of our model.
Finally, our theory relates to models of market microstructure. While economic theo-
rists are used to study strategic communication in the context of Crawford & Sobel (1982),
finance scholars have studied communication in markets extensively. In markets, strategic
communication (of demand) is often thought of in the context of rational expectations or
strategic trade models in the spirit of Grossman & Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig (1980), Vives
(1995), or Kyle (1989); see Vives (2008) for a survey. The reader familiar with this literature
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will find that our theory has much in common with these models. While the majority of
papers in this literature assumes normally distributed noise terms, a small number of papers
extends the results to the context of elliptically distributed noise. We borrow extensively
from the ideas in that work. See in particular No¨ldeke & Tro¨ger (2006) and the references
cited therein.
The remainder paper is organized as follows. In section two, we present the model and
the main assumptions. In section three, we define strategies and analyze communication
about signals. In section four we derive and analyze a reduced form model where wlog
communication is about conditional means. We discuss in depth how conflicts between
Sender and Receiver depend on the quality of information that the Sender observes. In
section five, we analyze optimal noise structures from various angles. In section six, we
focus on comparative statics. A final section concludes. Lengthy proofs are gathered in the
Appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Timing
We consider a Sender-Receiver-game with two players and the following underlying decision
problem. The Receiver - henceforth she - needs to choose a decision x that affects the utility
of both the Sender - he from now on - and the Receiver. Preferences are given by
uR (x− ω) and uS (x− η) ,
where ui (x− ·) for i = R, S is a strictly concave, symmetric and differentiable function. The
preferences only depend on the distance between the actual action, x, and the ideal action
described by the bliss points xR(ω) = ω and xS(η) = η, respectively.
At the outset, neither the Sender nor the Receiver know the realization of the random
variables ω and η. However, the Sender privately observes noisy signals of their realizations
according to
sω = ω + εω and sη = η + εη,
where εω and εη are independent noise terms with variances that are determined at the start
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of the game.3 We discuss in section 5 in detail how this is done. Until then, we take the
information structure as arbitrary and given.
After observing the realizations of sω and sη, the Sender sends a message to the Receiver.
The Receiver observes the message - but not the Sender’s information - and then chooses
x. The Receiver cannot commit ex ante how to use the information she receives from the
Sender.
2.2 Feasible Information Structures
We assume that the random variables ω, η, εω, εη are jointly elliptically distributed, with
finite first and second moments. Each of the marginals has mean zero; let σ2ω, σ
2
η, σ
2
εω , σ
2
εη
denote the variances of the random variables. For convenience, we assume that the joint
distribution has a density. More assumptions are imposed later when needed.
Elliptical distributions can be defined as follows (e.g. Owen & Rabinovitch (1983), p.746).
Definition 1 Let µ be an n-component vector and Σ an (n× n) positive definite symmetric
matrix. Then, an n-component random vector X = (X1, . . . , Xn)
′ is said to be distributed
elliptically, X ∼ En(µ,Σ), if and only if for all nonzero n-component scalar vectors α,
all the univariate random variables α′X such that V ar (α′X) is constant follow the same
distribution. If X has a density, then the density function of X, fX(x), can be expressed in
the form fX(x) = cn |Σ|−1/2 g
(
(x− µ)′Σ−1 (x− µ)), for some constant cn and some function
g that is independent of n.
Given that the first two moments exist, µ is the mean vector and Σ is proportional to
(that is, up to a constant factor equal to) the variance-covariance matrix.
Elliptical distributions have convenient properties. We summarize the properties we use
in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Let X ∼ En (µ,Σ) be elliptically distributed. Further let
X = (X1, X2) , µ = (µ1, µ2) , Σ =
(
Σ11 Σ12
Σ21 Σ22
)
,
3The assumption of independence is innocuous since any signal structure can be decomposed in this way.
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where the dimensions of X1, µ1 and Σ11 are, respectively, m, m and m×m.
i) The elliptical distribution is symmetric about µ, i.e.
f(µ+ ∆) = f(µ−∆) ∀∆.
ii) Linear combinations of elliptically distributed random variables are again elliptical.
iii) The conditional distribution of X1|X2 is elliptical, i.e.
X1|X2 ∼ Em
(
µX1 + Σ12Σ
−1
22 (X2 − µX2) ,Σ11 − Σ12Σ−122 Σ21
)
.
Proof. i) by definition, ii) see for example, Fang et al. (1990) Thm 2.16, iii) see for
example, Cambanis et al. (1981) Cor 5.
2.3 Leading examples
The leading example for symmetric loss functions that is commonly used in the literature is
the quadratic
uR (x− ω) = − (x− ω)2 and uS (x− η) = − (x− η)2 .
Examples of elliptical distributions are the normal distribution, Student’s–t distribution, the
exponential power distribution, and the logistic distribution.
While the reader is of course welcome to replace symmetric loss by quadratic loss and
elliptical by normal in what follows, all our results until and including Theorem 1 extend to
the more general environment.
2.4 Ideal choices
Before discussing strategic communication, it is useful to set the stage and investigate the
players’ ideal choices if they had (somehow) access to the same information. The following
result follows conveniently from the statistical structure we have imposed:
Lemma 2 The ideal choice functions of the Receiver and the Sender are
xR (sω, sη) ≡ arg max
x
E
[
uR (x− ω)∣∣ sω, sη] = E [ω| sω, sη] = αRsω + βRsη
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and
xS (sω, sη) ≡ arg max
x
E
[
uS (x− η)∣∣ sω, sη] = E [η| sω, sη] = αSsω + βSsη,
where αi, βi for i = R, S are weights, independent of sω, sη.
The result is due to the symmetry of both the loss functions and the posterior distribu-
tions given the information. The lemma is straightforward to see for the case of a quadratic
loss function - because first-order conditions become linear in that case. The extension to
more general, symmetric loss functions follows from the fact that, if the choice x is set equal
to the posterior mean, the posterior distribution is symmetric around the choice. Hence
expected marginal gains to increasing the action are exactly offset by expected marginal
losses. The linear expressions are simply a consequence of elliptical distributions. For future
reference, we note that the weights in the Sender’s ideal choice are
αS = σ2εη
ρωησωση
(σ2ω + σ
2
εω)(σ
2
η + σ
2
εη)− (ρωησωση)2
and
βS = σ2η
σ2εω − σ2ωρ2ωη + σ2ω
(σ2ω + σ
2
εω)(σ
2
η + σ
2
εη)− (ρωησωση)2
and the weights in the Receiver’s ideal choice are
αR = σ2ω
σ2εη + σ
2
η − σ2ηρ2ωη(
σ2ω + σ
2
εω
) (
σ2η + σ
2
εη
)
− (ρωησωση)2
,
and
βR = σ2εω
σησωρωη(
σ2ω + σ
2
εω
) (
σ2η + σ
2
εη
)
− (ρωησωση)2
,
where
ρωη ≡ Cov (ω, η)
σωση
is the coefficient of correlation between ω and η.
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2.5 Conflicts and common interests
We can now investigate whether and how the Sender and the Receiver are agreed or disagreed
upon optimal actions as a function of the information they have. Since ω and η have the
same prior mean, the Sender and the Receiver are agreed upon the optimal action if the
Sender does not obtain any new information; formally, this is the limiting case when σ2εω and
σ2εη both go to infinity. So, potential conflicts arise only with respect to how new information
should be used. If the coefficient of correlation satisfies ρωη ≤ 0, then the Sender and the
Receiver disagree fundamentally on how news should affect choices. In particular, while
the players’ ideal choices always increase in the signal about their bliss point, for ρωη ≤ 0,
we have βR ≤ 0 and αS ≤ 0. Therefore, xR (sω, sη) increases in sω and (weakly) decreases
in sη, while the exact opposite is true for x
S (sω, sη) . We conjecture that no meaningful
communication is possible in that case.
Next it is illuminating to look at the opposite extreme, where players are completely
agreed upon optimal actions. The following lemma states these results formally.
Lemma 3 The Sender and the Receiver are completely agreed upon ideal choices for all
σ2εη , σ
2
εω ≥ 0 if ρωη = 1 and ση = σω. In the limiting case where σ2εη → ∞, the Sender and
the Receiver agree on the use of signal sω for all σ
2
εω ≥ 0 if σωση = ρωη. In the limiting case
where σ2εω →∞, the Sender and the Receiver agree on the use of signal sη for all σ2εη ≥ 0 if
σω
ση
= 1
ρωη
.
The limits are formally identical to the case where there is only one signal available.
Thus, another way to state the result is to say that only one signal is available, so that all
moments exist.
Clearly, we are interested in the case where some communication is possible. On the
other hand, communication becomes interesting from the strategic perspective only if there
is some disagreement. Therefore, we impose the following
Assumption 1: 0 < ρωη < 1.
Assumption 1 implies that, whenever the Sender obtains two informative signals, then
the Sender and the Receiver will disagree on the ideal choice for all signal realizations but
the one where both signals are equal to the prior mean.
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Next, one may wonder what fundamental difference it makes that the signal is two-
dimensional rather than one-dimensional. The answer depends on the model parameters.
For the interesting case, that the following lemma singles out, a two-dimensional signal allows
us to talk about relative disagreement in the sense that the Sender and the Receiver each
have a signal that they find of primary importance to him/her.
Lemma 4 For ρωη ≤ σωση ≤ 1ρωη , the Receiver is relatively more responsive to signal sω than
the Sender is, αR ≥ αS, and the Sender is relatively more responsive to sη, βS ≥ βR. For
σω
ση
> 1
ρωη
, the Receiver reacts stronger to any piece of news (that is each of the signals), for
σω
ση
< ρωη, the Sender reacts stronger than the Receiver to any piece of news.
Relative disagreement and our way to model it are the essential contributions of this
paper; conversely, in the case where any player is absolutely more responsive than the other
one - that is, reacts stronger to any piece of news - our structure does not give rise to
substantially new insights.4 Therefore, we focus on what is new here by imposing
Assumption 2: ρωη ≤ σωση ≤ 1ρωη .
We are now ready to study strategic communication.
3 Strategic communication about signals
We now solve the second stage communication game under asymmetric information, taking
the information structure as given. The first stage in which the information structure is
determined is analyzed in section 5 below. We assume that the Receiver cannot commit to
what action she will take as a function of the message she receives; moreover, information is
soft, so the Sender cannot credibly commit to being honest either. The equilibrium concept
we use is Perfect Bayes Nash Equilibrium. In the equilibria we study, there won’t be any out
of equilibrium messages, so Perfect Bayes Nash Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium
coincide.
4In that case, we could as well assume a one-dimensional state and signal.
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3.1 Strategies
Take the information structure - that is the noise variances σ2εω and σ
2
εη - as given. After the
Sender has observed his signals, he communicates a message m ∈ M to the Receiver. The
message space M is assumed to be rich. It is enough to consider pure message strategies
for the Sender.5 A pure Sender strategy maps the Sender’s information into messages M :
R2 → M, (sω, sη) 7→ m. A pure Receiver strategy maps messages into actions, X : M→ R,
m 7→ x. Let f (ω|m) denote the pdf of the Receiver’s posterior over ω given the message
sent by the Sender and let f (η| sω, sη) denote the pdf of the Sender’s posterior over η given
his information.
The Receiver’s optimal action given the Sender’s message is
x∗ (m) ∈ arg max
x∈R
∫
uR (x− ω) f (ω|m) dω.
Note that the Receiver solves a concave problem for arbitrary posteriors f (ω|m). Hence
x∗ (m) is in fact unique and the Receiver never wishes to use a mixed strategy.
The Sender’s optimal message solves
m (sω, sη) ∈ arg max
m∈M
∫
uS (x∗ (m)− η) f (η| sω, sη) dη.
The Receiver updates her information about ω based on the message she receives, so the
posterior distribution satisfies Bayes law.6 Thus, there is no restriction on the message space
and the equilibrium concept is the standard one.
3.2 Non-existence of full communication equilibria
Recall that Assumption 1 implies conflicting interests of the Sender and the Receiver with
respect to the interpretation of new information. Under this situation, there cannot be an
equilibrium where the Sender communicates all his information truthfully. Formally, we have
the following result:
5More specifically, the best equilibria of our game involve pure strategies. Therefore, we abstain from
introducing the notational clutter to deal formally with mixed strategies.
6Let s (m) ≡ {(sω, sη) : m (sω, sη) = m}, then f (ω|m) = f(ω,m)∫∫
s(m)
f(sω,sη)dsωdsη
.
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Lemma 5 Under Assumption 1, there does not exist any equilibrium where m (sω, sη) =
(sω, sη).
Proof. Suppose there exists an equilibrium with m (sω, sη) = (sω, sη). Then, the Receiver’s
posterior is f (ω| sω, sη) resulting in an optimal choice x∗ (sω, sη) = xR (sω, sη) = E [ω| sω, sη] .
By Assumption 1, E [ω| sω, sη] 6= E [η| sω, sη] for any (sω, sη) 6= (0, 0) . Hence, regardless of
the signal structure, as long as the informational environment satisfies Assumption 1, there
cannot be a fully informative equilibrium.
Even if the Sender and the Receiver agree that both signals should be used to reach a good
decision, they disagree with respect to the weight they attach to the individual sources of
information. Therefore, the Sender is not willing to reveal all of his information truthfully to
the Receiver if the latter cannot commit to use the information the way the Sender proposes.
3.3 Sender preferences and conditional expectations
Full revelation is not an equilibrium outcome. If not all the information, how much infor-
mation can in equilibrium be revealed? To answer this question, we need to address the
Sender’s choice between actions he can induce. The following lemma states formally that
the Sender’s preferences over messages (that induce distinct actions) depend only on the
distance between induced actions and the Sender’s conditional expectation of η given his
information.
Lemma 6 The expected utility of the Sender depends only on |x− E [η| sω, sη]|, the distance
between the choice and the conditional mean. Formally, we have∫
u (x′ − η) f (η| sω, sη) dη =
∫
u (x′′ − η) f (η| sω, sη) dη
for any two choices x′, x′′ satisfying x′ − E [η| sω, sη] = E [η| sω, sη]− x′′.
By assumption, the Sender’s vNM-utility function depends only on the distance between
the action and the state η. The proof of the lemma shows that the Sender’s expected utility
depends only on the distance from the action to the posterior expected value of the state η.
The reason is simply that the ideal choice of the Sender is equal to E [η| sω, sη] by Lemma
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2. Moreover, by symmetry of the posterior distribution about E [η| sω, sη], the Sender is
indifferent between any actions that are equally far away from the posterior mean. To get
an intuition why Lemma 6 is true consider the case of quadratic loss functions. The Sender’s
expected utility is then given by∫
− (x− η)2 f (η| sω, sη) dη =
∫
− (x− E [η| sω, sη])2 f (η| sω, sη) dη − V ar (η| sω, sη) ,
making the result obvious for that case.
Since the Sender’s expected utility depends only on |x− E [η| sω, sη]| , Sender types sω, sη
who share the same posterior mean, E [η| sω, sη] , have the same preferences over any two
distinct actions x′ and x′′. Therefore, such types will necessarily pool on the same messages,
implying that at most the posterior mean can be communicated. Hence, without loss we
now reduce the Sender’s message space to the unidimensional space of conditionally expected
means.
3.4 Relevant information
Define the new random variable
θ ≡ E [η |sω, sη ] .
Being a (linear) function of random variables, θ is random as well. Since linear functions
of elliptically distributed random variables are again elliptically distributed, θ follows an
elliptical distribution θ ∼ E (0, σ2θ) and the joint distribution of ω, η, and θ is elliptical too.
More specifically, the variance of θ is given by
V ar (θ) =
(
αS
)2 (
σ2ω + σ
2
εω
)
+ 2αSβSρωησωση +
(
βS
)2 (
σ2η + σ
2
εη
)
.
Substituting for αS and βS, we have
V ar (θ) = σ2η
σ2εω
σ2ω
+
σ2εη
σ2η
ρ2ωη + 1− ρ2ωη(
1 +
σ2εω
σ2ω
)(
1 +
σ2εη
σ2η
)
− ρ2ωη
. (1)
Likewise, the covariance of ω and θ is given by
Cov (ω, θ) = αSσ2ω + β
Sρωησωση,
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and so we have
Cov (ω, θ) = σησωρωη
σ2εη
σ2η
+
σ2εω
σ2ω
+ 1− ρ2ωη(
1 +
σ2εω
σ2ω
)(
1 +
σ2εη
σ2η
)
− ρ2ωη
. (2)
Finally, we (trivially) have
Cov (η, θ) = V ar (θ) . (3)
4 One-dimensional strategic communication
The two-dimensional model reduces without loss of generality to a one-dimensional one. We
now address communication in the reduced form model. However, it is important to keep the
“micro-foundations” in mind: not any reduced form model is feasible, that is, can be gener-
ated from the underlying information structures. We first derive the set of feasible reduced
form communication models and discuss conflicts and common interests in the reduced form
model. Then we discuss the structure of the most informative communication equilibria; that
is, communication equilibria that induce the highest number of distinct Receiver responses.
These are the equilibria that are commonly studied in the literature.
4.1 Feasible reduced forms and implied conflicts
Ultimately, the players do not care about the signals sω and sη but about the posteriors
arising from them. So, we can equivalently think of a situation where the Sender obtains a
signal θ that is perfectly correlated with his bliss point η, that is Cov (η, θ) = V ar (θ) by
(3) . The correlation of ω and θ depends on the underlying noise structure. To determine
the players’ conflicts when communicating about θ, we again investigate the Receiver’s ideal
choice if she had (somehow) directly access to the information θ. Building on Lemma 1, we
know that
ω| θ ∼ E
(
Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
θ, σ2ω(1− ρ2ωθ)
)
.
Note that the posterior mean depends crucially on the ratio Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)
, the slope of the regres-
sion of ω on θ. The intercept is zero by the fact that the priors of ω and η have the same
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mean. If Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)
< 1, then the Receiver is conservative relative to the Sender; given a pos-
itive realization of θ, the Receiver’s ideal choice is smaller than the Sender’s and vice versa
for a negative realization. If Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)
> 1, then the Sender is relatively more conservative
than the Receiver; put differently, the Receiver is relatively progressive; from the Sender’s
perspective the Receiver overreacts to news. Finally, if Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)
= 1, then neither the Sender
nor the Receiver is more conservative than the other player. Before we dwell further on this
issue we investigate whether and when all these cases are relevant. The following lemma
characterizes the set of feasible moments Cov (ω, θ) and V ar (θ) .
Lemma 7 Any Cov (ω, θ) ∈ (0, σησωρωη] can be generated from signals with finite variances.
Moreover, for any fixed Cov (ω, θ) = C, the set of feasible variances is by Assumption 2 non-
empty and given by V ar (θ) ∈
[
ση
σω
ρωηC,
ση
σω
1
ρωη
C
]
. By implication
Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
∈
[
σω
ση
ρωη,
σω
ση
1
ρηω
]
.
The following figure depicts the set of feasible ratios Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)
in three relevant cases that
satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2.
ρωησωση
σ2ηρ
2
ωησ
2
η
Cov(ω, θ) = V ar(θ)
Cov(ω, θ)
V ar(θ)
Cov(ω, θ) = V ar(θ)
ρωησωση
σ2ηρ
2
ωησ
2
η
Cov(ω, θ)
V ar(θ)
Cov(ω, θ) = V ar(θ)
ρωησωση
σ2ηρ
2
ωησ
2
η
Cov(ω, θ)
V ar(θ)
1
Figure 1: Case one (left panel): feasible set for σω
ση
∈
(
ρωη,
1
ρηω
)
; case two (center panel):
feasible set for σω
ση
= ρωη; case three (right panel): feasible set for
σω
ση
= 1
ρωη
.
In case one the prior uncertainty satisfies σω
ση
∈
(
ρωη,
1
ρηω
)
, cases two and three depict
the extreme cases where σω
ση
= ρωη or
σω
ση
= 1
ρωη
, respectively.
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Usually, the conflict between Sender and Receiver - the bias in terms of the standard
language - is a primitive of the model. In contrast, in the present model conflicts arise
endogenously as a function of the quality of the Sender’s information. Recall that V ar (θ) =
Cov (η, θ) by construction. Therefore, signal structures that imply a Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)
−ratio that is
smaller than unity contain information that is relatively more useful to the Sender than to
the Receiver. As a result, the Receiver obviously would want to rely less on that sort of
information than the Sender would do. Vice versa for information structures that satisfy
Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)
> 1. Finally, if Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)
= 1, then the information is equally useful to the Sender and
the Receiver. Note that all three constellations are possible for some information structures
in case one, while the Receiver is weakly conservative for any feasible information structure
in case two and weakly progressive for any information structure in case three. Note finally,
that for all conflicts described by Assumptions 1 and 2, there exist information structures
that are equally useful to the Sender and the Receiver, that is Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)
= 1. Even though the
Receiver’s ideal choice based on the underlying signals differs from the Sender’s ideal choice
based on these signals, the Receiver’s ideal choice based on θ is identically equal to θ.
To illustrate further, consider case one where σω
ση
∈
(
ρωη,
1
ρηω
)
and imagine three of the
feasible information structures with the same covariance but different levels of variance. For
concreteness, let Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)′ = c
′ > 1, Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)′′ = c
′′ < 1, and Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)′′′ = c
′′′ = 1.The information
structures are depicted in the left panel of the following Figure 2. The right panel of the
figure shows the implied ideal choice functions of the Sender and the Receiver, xS (θ) and
xR (θ) , for the three information structures. Note that by construction xS (θ) = θ for all
three information structures, while xR (θ) = cθ, for c ∈ {c′, c′′, c′′′} .
4.2 Equilibria
We now address equilibrium communication. Our game has the standard plethora of equi-
libria in the communication game. It is always an equilibrium that all Sender types θ pool
on the same message (or mix over all available messages) and the Receiver always chooses
x = 0. This is the babbling equilibrium. In addition to that, partitional equilibria exist
where sets of Sender types within given intervals pool on the same message. More inter-
estingly, depending on the ratio Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)
there can exist a class of equilibria that has not
been studied so far: smooth communication equilibria where the Sender honestly states his
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Figure 2: Conflict in terms of covariance and variance (left panel), and actions (right panel).
conclusions, that is truthfully reveals θ, and the Receiver rightly takes this recommendation
at face value. These equilibria feature smooth, i.e. infinitely often differentiable Sender and
Receiver strategies, and thus enable perfect communication about θ. This is possible since
interests are aligned in this subspace and the underlying signals that trigger conflict remain
garbled in θ.
In the following two subsections we analyze the most informative equilibria for given
information structures, that is, the equilibria that induce the highest number of Receiver
actions, as a function of the given information structure. First, for general symmetric prefer-
ences, we analyze the situation where the Sender and the Receiver are equally conservative,
that is Cov (ω, θ) = V ar (θ). Second, for quadratic preferences and log-concave densities, we
look at the cases where one player is more conservative and only partitional equilibria exist.
4.2.1 Perfect communication about conditional means
Suppose the Sender communicates his conditionally expected value of η given his information
truthfully to the Receiver, that is
m (θ) = θ for all θ.
The Receiver’s best reply given information θ is
E [ω| θ] = Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
θ.
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Clearly, the Sender will only be happy to communicate θ truthfully if the Receiver does
exactly what the Sender would want to do, so
E [ω| θ] = θ for all θ,
which requires that
Cov (ω, θ) = V ar (θ) , (4)
corresponding to exactly the case where the Sender and the Receiver are equally conservative.
The following theorem states this result formally and relates equation (4) to the underlying
noise structure:
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exist information structures, defined by
σ2εω
σ2ω
and
σ2εη
σ2η
, such that Cov (ω, θ) = V ar (θ) so that a perfectly informative equilibrium in
conditional expectations θ exists. More specifically, for σω
ση
∈
(
ρωη,
1
ρωη
]
, Cov (ω, θ) = V ar (θ)
if and only if
σ2εω
σ2ω
and
σ2εη
σ2η
satisfy
σ2εη
σ2η
=
(
1− σω
ση
ρωη
)
ρωη
(
σω
ση
− ρωη
) σ2εω
σ2ω
+
(
1− σω
ση
ρωη
)
ρωη
(
σω
ση
− ρωη
) (1− ρ2ηω) . (5)
For σω
ση
= ρωη, we have Cov (ω, θ) = V ar (θ) iff
σ2εω
σ2ω
= 0 and only signal sω is available
(corresponding to the limiting case with two signals where σ2εη →∞).
Our previous discussion makes the proof of the theorem trivial: equation (5) arises from
plugging αS and βS into (4) and solving. For σω
ση
∈
(
ρωη,
1
ρωη
)
, (5) describes a linear locus
with positive intercept and slope in the signal-noise ratio space. In the extreme case where
σω
ση
= 1
ρωη
, the locus coincides with the horizontal axis: since the Sender is only interested
in η, he does not use signal sω, so the noise ratio
σ2εω
σ2ω
becomes irrelevant. In the other
extreme case where σω
ση
= ρωη, the Sender needs to observe ω without noise and to obtain no
information about η to ensure Cov (ω, θ) = V ar (θ) .
Perfect communication about conditional expectations is possible provided that the
Sender’s and the Receiver’s preferences are perfectly aligned in that subspace of the Sender’s
information. In turn, interests are perfectly aligned in that subspace if the regression of
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ω on θ has a slope of unity: even though she would want to, the Receiver cannot extract
more than θ from what she is told. Notice that there is still bunching of Sender types; the
Sender makes garbled statements about the underlying information. However, in contrast
to partitional equilibria, the bunches are very easy to characterize. The surprising element
is that smooth communication strategies can be part of the equilibrium even though the
players disagree, which is clearly the case for σω
ση
∈
(
ρωη,
1
ρωη
)
.
4.2.2 Partitional equilibria
Consider now experiments for which Cov (ω, θ) 6= V ar (θ) . For these experiments, there
exists no equilibrium involving invertible message strategies in θ. We make the following
assumptions:
Assumption 3: uR (x, ω) = − (x− ω)2 and uS (x, ω) = − (x− η)2.
Assumption 4: The distribution of θ has a log-concave density.
Assumption 3 is the leading example of symmetric loss functions that is adopted through-
out the literature. The leading class of distributions that is both elliptical and has a log-
concave density is the normal distribution. These assumptions are convenient to study
partitional equilibria. We can characterize such equilibria with a countable number of mes-
sages mi for i = 1, . . . , n. Under Assumption 3, if Sender types θ ∈ (θi−1, θi] pool on message
mi, then the Receiver optimally responds with the action
x∗i = E [ω| θ ∈ (θi−1, θi]] .
The reason is that under Assumption 3, marginal utility becomes linear. Since preferences
satisfy the single crossing condition, we can characterize the optimal Sender responses by
the marginal types θi who are indifferent between sending message mi and message mi+1.
The indifference condition for type θi is
θi − E [ω| θ ∈ (θi−1, θi]] = E [ω| θ ∈ (θi, θi+1]]− θi.
For elliptical distributions, we have the following convenient property:
E [ω| θ ∈ (θi−1, θi]] = E [E [ω| θ ∈ (θi−1, θi]]| θ] = E [E [ω| θ]| θ ∈ (θi−1, θi]]
=
Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
E [θ| θ ∈ (θi−1, θi]] ,
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where the equalities in the first line use the law of iterated expectations and the second line
uses the linearity of conditional expectations in the elliptical class. The system of indifference
conditions thus simplifies to
θi − Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
E [θ| θ ∈ (θi−1, θi]] = Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
E [θ| θ ∈ (θi, θi+1]]− θi.
Log-concavity ensures stability of this system of equations.7
As pointed out above and stated formally in Theorem 2 below, the number of induced
Receiver actions crucially depends on which player is more conservative. For Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)
< 1,
the Receiver is more conservative than the Sender. For Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)
> 1, the Sender is more
conservative than the Receiver.
Theorem 2 Under Assumptions 1 - 4, we have:
i) for any Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)
, there always exists an equilibrium inducing two distinct actions,
ii) for Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)
< 1, there is no upper bound on the number of induced actions,
iii) for Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)
≥ 2 the maximum number of induced actions in equilibrium is n = 2.
It is always an equilibrium if the Sender says either “up” or “down” and the Receiver
responds by taking an action equal to the upward and downward truncated means, respec-
tively, where the point of truncation is the prior mean. This is simply due to the symmetry
of the distributions within the elliptical class and the fact that the Sender and the Receiver
agree based on prior information. This is in stark contrast to models with a unidirectional
bias between the Sender and the Receiver, where communication completely breaks down if
the bias becomes too large.
7It is well known for distributions with log-concave densities that ∂∂θi−1E [θ| θ ∈ (θi−1, θi]] ≤ 1 and
∂
∂θi
E [θ| θ ∈ (θi−1, θi]] ≤ 1. Moreover, (as shown, e.g. by Szalay (2012))
∂
∂θi−1
E [θ| θ ∈ (θi−1, θi]] + ∂
∂θi
E [θ| θ ∈ (θi−1, θi]] ≤ 1.
Szalay (2012) uses these properties to demonstrate uniqueness of equilibria inducing a given number of
induced actions in his model. The details how log-concavity enters into the present model can be found in
the proof of Theorem 2.
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Communication with a conservative Receiver works pretty well in the sense that there
exists an equilibrium inducing countably infinitely many actions. Communication is arbi-
trarily precise around the prior mean. In contrast, partition elements farther away from the
prior mean have some size. The reason is simply that the ideal choice functions of the Sender
and the Receiver intersect at the prior mean; moreover, the distance between ideal choices
increases linearly in the distance from the prior mean. These effects are in line with results
in the literature. Gordon (2010) finds that a countably infinite equilibrium exists in case of
an “outward biased” Sender or in other words in case of a conservative Receiver.
The case of a relatively conservative Sender is substantially different. In particular, if
the Receiver wishes to react more than twice as much to new information than the Sender
wishes, then communication almost breaks down. Intuitively, for information structures
where Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)
≥ 2 the Sender’s information is considerably more precise about ω than about
η. Clearly, in that case θ contains primarily information about ω. Therefore, the Sender is
reluctant to give precise information about θ.
We have tried but were unable to get a complete characterization of finite versus infinite
equilibria. The reason is that the case Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)
> 1 counteracts the assumptions that give
regularity to the problem (log-concavity). For the same reason, we have not been able to
show that the number of induced actions in any finite equilibrium is decreasing in Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)
;
however, this is a reasonable conjecture. We pursue these questions in ongoing companion
work.
5 Choosing information structures
In this section, we characterize optimal information structures in various settings. To obtain
such characterizations, we continue to invoke Assumption 3, i.e., assume that both the
Sender and the Receiver have quadratic loss functions. Exploiting that assumption, we
begin by deriving explicit expressions for both players’ equilibrium expected utilities. Then,
we analyze the cases where each player is interested in her decision payoff only and either the
Sender or the Receiver has the right to choose the information structure. This corresponds to
the perspectives taken in the persuasion and disclosure literatures (if the Receiver chooses the
information structure) and the literature on information acquisition (if the Sender chooses
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the information structure). Then, we allow for ex ante payments between the Sender and the
Receiver. More specifically, the Receiver hires a Sender and needs to convince the Sender to
participate by an ex ante payment to the Sender. Moreover, the Receiver can commit to an
information structure, again the perspective taken in the persuasion literature. Finally, we
look at the case where the Receiver can only select the type of Sender, where a Sender’s type
is described by the joint distribution of ω and η. Subsequently, it is the Sender who has the
right to choose the information structure. Perhaps surprisingly, under the latter two extensive
forms, optimal information structures are such that they enable smooth communication.
5.1 Equilibrium payoffs
In an equilibrium where an uncountable infinity of messages is sent, m (θ) = θ for all θ, the
Receiver’s optimal decision schedule is x∗ (θ) = θ and her expected utility for the quadratic
loss case simplifies to∫ ∫
uR (x∗ − ω) f (ω| θ) dωf (θ) dθ = −V ar (θ) + 2Cov (θ, ω)− V ar (ω)
= Cov (θ, ω)− V ar (ω) ,
where the second equality follows from the fact that Cov (θ, ω) = V ar (θ) in an equilibrium
where x∗ (θ) = θ. If an equilibrium with a countable number of n messages mi for i = 1, . . . , n
is played, types θ ∈ Θi ≡ [θi−1, θi] pool on message mi and thereby induce an optimal
Receiver action x∗i = E [ω| θ ∈ Θi] . The Receiver’s expected payoff in such an equilibrium is∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
∫
uR (x∗i − ω) f (ω| θ) dωf (θ) dθ
=
Cov (θ, ω)2
V ar (θ)2
(
V ar (θ)−
∑n
i=1
piV ar (θ |θ ∈ Θi )
)
− V ar (ω) .
where pi ≡ Pr (θ ∈ Θi). Note that the two expressions have the common representation
Cov (θ, ω)2
V ar (θ)2
(
V ar (θ)− Ip
∑n
i=1
piV ar (θ |θ ∈ Θi )
)
− V ar (ω) , (6)
where Ip is an indicator variable taking value one if the equilibrium involves a countable
number of actions and zero otherwise. Moreover, a smooth communication equilibrium exists
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only if Cov(θ,ω)
V ar(θ)
= 1. Thus, we can think of the Receiver’s expected utility as of an upper bound
- the expected utility when θ is communicated smoothly - minus an expected loss term that
arises when and only when information is lost through partitional communication.
Likewise, the Sender’s expected utility in any equilibrium inducing x∗ (θ) = θ is∫ ∫
uS (x∗ − η) f (η| θ) dηf (θ) dθ = −V ar (θ) + 2Cov (η, θ)− V ar (η)
= V ar (θ)− V ar (η) ,
where the second equality follows from the fact that E [η| θ] = θ (which is equivalent to
Cov (η, θ) = V ar (θ)). The Sender’s expected utility in an equilibrium that induces a count-
able number of actions x∗i = E [ω| θ ∈ Θi] is∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
∫
uS (x∗i − η) f (η| θ) dηf (θ) dθ
=
(
2
Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
− Cov (ω, θ)
2
V ar (θ)2
)(
V ar (θ)−
∑n
i=1
piV ar (θ |θ ∈ Θi )
)
− V ar (η) .
Thus, the Sender’s expected utility in any equilibrium can be written conveniently as(
2
Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
− Cov (ω, θ)
2
V ar (θ)2
)(
V ar (θ)− Ip
∑n
i=1
piV ar (θ |θ ∈ Θi )
)
− V ar (η) . (7)
Again, we can decompose expected utility into the upper bound, which is reached if com-
munication is smooth in θ, and expected losses arising when communication is non-smooth.
For convenience of the reader, the elementary calculations behind these simplifications are
gathered in Lemma 8 in the Appendix.
We are now ready to discuss optimal information structures.
5.2 Privately optimal information structures
Suppose first the Receiver has the right to determine the information structure. This is the
perspective taken in the disclosure literature, where a principal chooses the information that
some agent obtains without the principal getting to see the realizations of the agent’s signals.
In the same spirit, suppose the Receiver gets to choose the information structure, but the
Sender alone observes the realizations of signals.
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An optimal information structure from the Receiver’s perspective solves the problem
max
Cov(ω,θ),V ar(θ)
(6) (PR)
s.t. Cov (ω, θ) , V ar (θ) feasible.
A feasible information structure is one that is generated by some given noise-signal ratios.
Likewise, suppose the Sender has the right to choose the information structure. That is
the perspective taken in the literature on information acquisition. An optimal information
structure from his perspective solves the problem
max
Cov(ω,θ),V ar(θ)
(7) (PS)
s.t. Cov (ω, θ) , V ar (θ) feasible.
In line with the tradition in the strategic communication literature, we assume that the most
informative equilibrium is played in each continuation game induced by a given information
structure. Problems (PR) and (PS) are both pretty involved. The reason is as follows.
While the upper bound depends on the information structure in straightforward fashion,
the expected losses due to partitional communication depend in very intricate ways on the
information structure. More specifically, the information structure influences the equilib-
rium partition, the distribution of θ within any given partition element, and the probability
distribution over the partition elements Θi for i = 1, . . . , n. For this reason, we defer a com-
plete characterization of solutions to these problems to a separate paper. Here, we contend
ourselves in establishing qualitative properties of the solutions. An information structure is
said to be optimal from the Receiver’s or the Sender’s perspective if it solves problem (PR)
or (PS) , respectively.
Theorem 3 Under Assumptions 1 - 3, an information structure is optimal from the Re-
ceiver’s (Sender’s) perspective only if it makes her (him) relatively progressive, that is if
Cov (ω, θ) ≥ (≤)V ar (θ) .
Put differently, an information structure cannot be optimal for the Receiver if it makes her
look relatively more conservative than the Sender. The formal proof works as follows. Con-
sider an information structure one, (Cov1 (ω, θ) , V ar1 (θ)), satisfying Cov1 (ω, θ) < V ar1 (θ) .
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Such an information structure is dominated from the Receiver’s perspective. In particular,
it is true that for any such information structure, there exists another information structure
two, (Cov2 (ω, θ) , V ar2 (θ)) say, such that V ar2 (θ) = V ar1 (θ) and Cov2 (ω, θ) = V ar2 (θ) ,
so that the Receiver’s expected payoff under the latter information structure is strictly higher.
Intuitively, suppose the Receiver reacts strictly conservatively to the Sender’s advice.
Then, there are two sources of gains when the information structure is changed to one where
the Sender and the Receiver perfectly agree on how θ is mapped into actions. For the changed
information structure, there is no more loss due to partitional communication, because the
upper bound is tight. Moreover, the new information structure can always be generated
from the former one by increasing Cov (ω, θ) while leaving V ar (θ) unchanged. However,
such a change induces a further increase in the upper bound under smooth communication,
which further boosts the Receiver’s utility. The case where the Sender’s perspective is taken
corresponds simply to the mirror image of the Receiver’s problem, except that in considering
the alternative information structure, we leave the covariance unchanged and change the
variance instead.
The conclusion is very natural: the one who controls the information structure is in
equilibrium the one who is more enthusiastic when it comes to using the information, simply
because she/he chooses information that is relatively more useful to her/him. To see this,
recall again that each of them ultimately cares about how useful this piece of information is
with respect to their underlying motive, that is ω or η, respectively. Since θ is defined as the
conditional expected value of η given the available information, the conditional expectation
of η given θ is identically equal to θ. Hence, V ar (θ) = Cov (η, θ) . Thus, the Receiver prefers
information structures where Cov (ω, θ) ≥ Cov (η, θ) , because these information structures
contain relatively more information about the Receiver’s bliss point rather than the Sender’s
bliss point. Vice versa, the Sender prefers information structures where θ correlates better
with η rather than with ω.
5.3 Joint Surplus-optimal information structures
Consider now a situation where the Sender can opt out, in which case the Receiver has to
choose the action based on prior information alone. Suppose that the Receiver can pay the
Sender ex ante to convince him to participate. However, payments cannot depend on the
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advice nor on outcomes (nor on both advice and outcomes). Suppose further that both the
Sender and the Receiver are risk neutral with respect to money payments. Formally, the
Receiver’s payoff is now
Cov (θ, ω)2
V ar (θ)2
(
V ar (θ)− Ip
∑n
i=1
piV ar (θ |θ ∈ Θi )
)
− V ar (ω)− t,
while the Sender’s payoff is(
2
Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
− Cov (ω, θ)
2
V ar (θ)2
)(
V ar (θ)− Ip
∑n
i=1
piV ar (θ |θ ∈ Θi )
)
− V ar (η) + t.
If the Sender cares only about the decision when he participates - say, because only then he
puts skin into the game - then he will indeed participate if the latter expression is at least
equal to zero. If the Sender cares about the decision in any case, then his equilibrium payoff
needs to be at least equal to −V ar (η) . Since expected utilities in the two situations differ
only by a constant, it does not matter which way we go, so assume the former situation for the
sake of the argument. Clearly, the Receiver chooses the smallest payment that convinces the
Sender to participate. As a result, the Receiver effectively cares about the sum of Receiver
and Sender expected utility from decision making, that is the sum of (6) and (7) . Performing
this summation, and simplifying we obtain the Receiver’s problem:
max
Cov(ω,θ),V ar(θ)
2Cov (ω, θ)− 2Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
Ip
∑n
i=1
piV ar (θ |θ ∈ Θi )− V ar (ω)− V ar (η)
(PJ)
s.t. Cov (ω, θ) , V ar (θ) feasible.
Very conveniently, joint expected utility adds up to the sum of the maximally feasible indi-
vidual expected utilities under smooth communication, 2Cov (ω, θ) , minus an expected loss
term arising from partitional communication. The following theorem is now immediate:
Theorem 4 Under Assumptions 1 - 3, the unique solution to the problem of maximizing
joint expected payoff with respect to the information structure, satisfies V ar (θ) = Cov (θ, ω) =
Cov (η, ω) . Equivalently, for σω
ση
∈
(
ρωη,
1
ρωη
]
, in terms of the underlying noise variances,
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the solution is (
σ2εω , σ
2
εη
)
=
0,
(
1− σω
ση
ρωη
)
ρωη
(
σω
ση
− ρωη
) (1− ρ2ωη)σ2η
 .
The proof is very simple, so we keep the discussion heuristic. Since
∑n
i=1 piV ar (θ |θ ∈ Θi ) ≥
0, a smooth communication equilibrium - where Ip = 0 - is preferable to a partitional equilib-
rium, provided that the highest Cov (ω, θ) is reached in a smooth communication equilibrium.
Indeed, the highest Cov (θ, ω) is equal to Cov (η, ω) , the covariance between the underlying
motives.
Intuitively, the motives we have identified in the discussion of privately optimal infor-
mation structures exactly offset each other. The Receiver prefers situations in which the
information structure is relatively more useful to her - that is, where Cov (θ, ω) ≥ Cov (θ, η)
- while the Sender prefers situations where the opposite is true - that is, where Cov (θ, η) ≥
Cov (θ, ω) . Since the Sender and the Receiver have the same loss functions, these forces
exactly offset each other. Now, once attention is restricted to information structures that
are equally useful to both of them, so Cov (θ, ω) = Cov (θ, η), the Sender and the Receiver
have completely aligned interests with respect to the quality of information. They both
want to improve the informational content of the information structure. To see this, note
that for information structures where Cov(ω,θ)
V ar(θ)
= 1, the Receiver’s expected utility gross of
payments is Cov (θ, ω) − V ar (ω) , while the Sender’s expected utility gross of payments is
Cov (θ, ω)− V ar (η) , so both expressions are monotonically increasing in Cov (θ, ω) .
5.4 Selecting the advisor
Suppose the Sender has the right to choose the information structure. This is the case if
we think of the Sender as conducting investigations by himself which likely implies that he
also influences the precision of his information. However, the Receiver can select a Sender
out of the set defined by Assumptions 1 and 2. More specifically, take the Receiver’s prior
uncertainty, σω, and any ρωη satisfying Assumption 1 as given and think of the set of available
Sender types, ση, as the ones satisfying Assumption 2. For any given σω and ρωη, the set of
available Sender types thus forms a closed set ση ∈
[
σωρωη,
σω
ρωη
]
, with type ση =
σω
ρωη
being the
most uncertain Sender type and type ση = σωρωη being the Sender type facing the smallest
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uncertainty ex ante. Once selected, the Sender chooses an optimal information structure,
that is one that solves problem (PS) . Finally, the Sender and the Receiver communicate in
the most informative way for the chosen conflict and the chosen information structure. The
equilibrium outcome in this extensive form has the following structure:
Theorem 5 Under Assumptions 1 - 3, the Receiver can implement the optimal outcome
from her perspective by choosing the most certain advisor, σ∗η = σωρωη, who then chooses
to observe η without noise, σεη = 0. In the most informative equilibrium, communication is
smooth with V ar
(
θ;σ∗η
)
= Cov
(
θ, ω;σ∗η
)
= Cov
(
η, ω;σ∗η
)
= σ2ωρ
2
ωη.
The theorem follows straightforwardly from our previous results, so we state the proof
heuristically. Recall that privately optimal information structures are such that each player
would like to end up being relatively progressive. From our discussion of feasible information
structures, recall that the feasible set for any type ση > σωρωη contains elements with
Cov (θ, ω) > V ar (θ) . Eliminating such information structures never hurts the Receiver. In
contrast, by choosing type ση = σωρωη, the Receiver effectively chooses to be in case two of
Figure 1. Thereby, she ensures that the optimal information structures from that Sender’s
perspective within his feasible set satisfies V ar (θ) = Cov (θ, ω) and thus the necessary
condition for optimality from the Receiver’s perspective from Theorem 3. Indeed, this type
can observe everything of interest to him without noise and can still communicate smoothly
with the Receiver. Note that the Sender of type ση = σωρωη could also choose information
structures that would not enable the players to communicate smoothly. However, the point
is that the Sender has no interest to do so. By choosing the appropriate advisor, the Receiver
eliminates conflicts of interests with respect to the choice of information structure.
Note that there is no way the Receiver could do better. Any other Sender type would
choose an information structure that would make the Receiver relatively conservative, Cov(θ,ω)
V ar(θ)
≤
1, possibly strictly so. Moreover, there is no way to make the equilibrium choices more vari-
able than by having the most certain advisor.
33
6 Comparative statics of smooth communication equi-
libria
We have argued that smooth communication equilibria have some practical relevance, be-
cause they are induced by information structures that reflect optima of certain problems.
Moreover, smooth communication equilibria are analytically extremely tractable, allowing us
to address questions such as: How does the quality of advice and of decision-making depend
on conflicts of interests? How does prior uncertainty impact on decision-making? While
these questions are far from trivial in other approaches we are familiar with, our model gives
very clear and simple answers.
The equilibrium quality of advice is measured by V ar (θ) in a smooth communication
equilibrium. The higher the variance of induced choices, the better off are both the Sender
and the Receiver. In the most informative equilibrium for the optimal information structure,
we have
V ar (θ) = Cov (ω, η) = ρωησωση.
For the case of equal prior uncertainty, σω = ση, the alignment of interests can simply be
measured by the correlation between ω and η, ρωη. Both the Receiver and the Sender are
better off if interests are better aligned, that is when ρωη is increased. The reason is that a
Sender with better aligned preferences can be given access to better information. Therefore,
an advisor who is more trustworthy will appear more competent: his equilibrium information
is of better quality. The limiting case is perfectly aligned interests, which is of course ruled
out by Assumption 1.
Similarly, if the Receiver manages to select the ideal advisor among those satisfying
Assumptions 1 and 2, then
V ar (θ) = σ2ωρ
2
ωη,
supporting the same conclusion. The case where ρωη → 1 corresponds to the ideal world
where the best available advisor can be completely trusted. In that limiting case, the Receiver
manages to get perfect information through the Sender.
It is interesting to note that for a given correlation ρωη, higher prior uncertainty has a
positive impact on the quality of decision-making. The reason is that with a high level of
prior uncertainty, the weight attached to new information tends to be higher. Since the
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variance of ideal choices based on prior information only is zero, placing more weight on new
information unambiguously increases the variance.
7 Conclusions
We analyze a Sender-Receiver-Game of strategic communication in which the most informa-
tive equilibrium involves smooth communication and is therefore extremely tractable. The
key ingredients are as follows. The Sender and the Receiver are uncertain about but agreed
upon their most preferred action ex ante; the Sender observes a two-dimensional signal about
the underlying two-dimensional state of nature; while the Sender and the Receiver agree that
both pieces of information are useful to reach a decision, they disagree with respect to the
weight they would ideally attach to each piece of information. Relative, in contrast to abso-
lute disagreement leaves room for perfectly informative communication about a statistic of
the Sender’s information, his conditionally expected mean. Since his preferences for given
information depend only on conditional means, it is impossible to extract more information
from the Sender. Thus, we obtain the standard partial pooling result of cheap talk equi-
libria; however, pooling is much easier to characterize in the most efficient equilibrium of
our game, because only Sender types with the same conditional expectation pool and so we
obtain communication that is perfectly revealing in that space.
The upshot of our theory is that with relative (dis-)agreement, it becomes possible to talk
about conclusions, while it still remains pointless to ask the Sender to justify his conclusions.
E.g., communication by central banks about their anticipated inflation and things the like
is much easier than to discuss how they reached this conclusion. Finally, the equilibrium
is the more informative the better interests are aligned, with a slightly different twist than
other theories predict. The Sender is endogenously endowed with better information when
his interests are better aligned with those of the Receiver. Thus, more trustworthy Senders
are better informed and therefore give more accurate advice.
8 Appendix
Conditioning for elliptical distributions
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The expectation and covariance matrix are as follows
E[ω, η, sω, sη] = (0, 0, 0, 0)
′
and
Cov(ω, η, sω, sη) =

σ2ω ρωησωση σ
2
ω ρωησωση
ρωησωση σ
2
η ρωησωση σ
2
η
σ2ω ρωησωση σ
2
ω + σ
2
εω ρωησωση
ρωησωση σ
2
η ρωησωση σ
2
η + σ
2
εη
 .
By Lemma 1 the conditional variances can be calculated via
E [X |Y ] = µX + Σ12Σ−122 (Y − µY )
with
Cov (X, Y ) =
(
Σ11 Σ12
Σ21 Σ22
)
.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let (sω, sη) be the information available and let z = ω, η. Consider
the problem
max
x
∞∫
−∞
u (x− z) f (z| sω, sη) dz.
Since the utility depends only on the distance between x and z we have u′ (x− z) > 0 for
z < x, u′ (x− z) = 0 for x = z, and u′ (x− z) < 0 for z > x.
Consider the candidate solution x∗ = µ ≡ E [z| sω, sη] . The first-order condition can be
written as
∞∫
−∞
u′ (x∗ − z) f (z| sω, sη) dz =
∞∫
−∞
u′ (µ− z) f (z| sω, sη) dz = 0.
Consider two points z1 = µ−∆ and z2 = µ+ ∆ for arbitrary ∆ > 0. By symmetry of u
around its bliss point and symmetry of the distribution around µ, we have
u′ (∆) f (µ−∆| sω, sη) = −u′ (−∆) f (µ+ ∆| sω, sη) .
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Since this holds point-wise for each ∆, it also holds if we integrate over ∆. Thus, the first-
order condition applies at x∗ = µ. By concavity of u in x, only one value of x solves the
first-order condition. Hence, the solution is the one stated in the Lemma.
Proof of Lemma 3. The conditional expectations are
E [η|sω, sη] = αSsω + βSsη (8)
and
E [ω| sω, sη] = αRsω + βRsη, (9)
where αS, βS, αR, βR are defined in the text. Suppose σ2εη and σ
2
εω are both positive and
finite. Equations (8) and (9) are identical for all sω and sη if and only if
σ2εηρωησωση = σ
2
ω
(
σ2εη + σ
2
η − σ2ηρ2ωη
)
and
σ2η
(
σ2εω − σ2ωρ2ωη + σ2ω
)
= σησωρωησ
2
εω .
This requires that
σ2η
(
1− ρ2ωη
)
=
(
ρωηση
σω
− 1
)
σ2εη
and
σ2ω
(
1− ρ2ωη
)
=
(
σωρωη
ση
− 1
)
σ2εω .
A necessary condition for these two conditions to apply is that ρωη ≥ σωση and ρωη ≥
ση
σω
. Since
ρωη ∈ [−1, 1], this implies that ρωη = σησω = σωση and therefore, ρ2ωη = 1 and ση = σω.
Consider now the limiting cases where one of the variances goes out of bounds. Applying
l’Hoˆpital’s rule to (8) and (9) , we get in the limit as σ2εη →∞
E [ω|sω] = σ
2
ω
σ2ω + σ
2
εω
sω and E [η|sω] = ρωησωση
σ2ω + σ
2
εω
sω,
so that
E [ω|sω] ≡ E [η|sω] ⇔ ρωηση = σω.
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Likewise, for the case where σ2εω →∞, we get
E [ω|sη] = ρωησωση
σ2η + σ
2
εη
sη and E [η|sη] =
σ2η
σ2η + σ
2
εη
sη,
so
E [ω|sη] ≡ E [η|sη] ⇔ ρωησω = ση.
Proof of Lemma 4. Straightforward manipulations of αR, βR, αS, βS show that
αR ≥ αS ⇔ σ2ω
(
σ2η
(
1− ρ2ωη
)) ≥ σ2εησω (ρωηση − σω)
which is true for arbitrary σ2εη if and only if
σω
ση
≥ ρωη; and likewise,
βS ≥ βR ⇔ σ2ησ2ω
(
1− ρ2ωη
) ≥ σ2εωση (σωρωη − ση)
which again is true for arbitrary σ2εω if and only if
σω
ση
≤ 1
ρωη
.
Proof of Lemma 6. Let x′ − E [η| sω, sη] = E [η| sω, sη]− x′′ ≡ z > 0, then∫
u (x′ − η) f (η| sω, sη) dη =
∫
u (z − (η − E [η| sω, sη])) f (η| sω, sη) dη.
The random variable ηˆ ≡ η − E [η| sω, sη] has mean zero and symmetric distribution. Let
fˆ ( ηˆ| sω, sη) denote the standardized distribution (which has mean zero), then we have
f (η| sω, sη) = fˆ (η − E [η| sω, sη]| sω, sη) = fˆ ( ηˆ| sω, sη) and dη = dηˆ.
Take two realizations ηˆ′, ˆeta
′′
of ηˆ. By symmetry of u around 0, if ηˆ′ > 0 and ηˆ′′ = −ηˆ′, then
u (z − ηˆ′) = u (−z − ηˆ′′) ,
and symmetry of the distribution gives
fˆ ( ηˆ′| sω, sη) = fˆ ( ηˆ′′| sω, sη) .
Therefore,
u (z − ηˆ′) fˆ ( ηˆ′| sω, sη) = u (−z − ηˆ′′) fˆ ( ηˆ′′| sω, sη)
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holds true over the entire support for all pairs of (ηˆ′,−ηˆ′), implying that∫
u (z − ηˆ) fˆ ( ηˆ| sω, sη) dηˆ =
∫
u (−z − ηˆ) fˆ ( ηˆ| sω, sη) dηˆ
=
∫
u (−z − (η − E [η| sω, sη])) f (η| sω, sη) dη
=
∫
u (x′′ − η) f (η| sω, sη) dη.
Proof of Lemma 7. Recall that
Cov (ω, θ) = σησωρωη
a+ b+ 1− ρ2ωη
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
,
and
V ar (θ) = σ2η
a+ bρ2ωη + 1− ρ2ωη
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
,
where a ≡ σ2εω
σ2ω
and b ≡ σ
2
εη
σ2η
.
For future reference, note that
∂Cov (ω, θ)
∂a
= σησωρωη
−b (−ρ2ηω + b+ 1)(
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
)2 ,
∂Cov (ω, θ)
∂b
= σησωρωη
−a (−ρ2ηω + a+ 1)(
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
)2 ,
∂V ar (θ)
∂a
=
∂
∂a
σ2η
a+ bρ2ωη + 1− ρ2ωη
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
=
−b2ρ2ηωσ2η(
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
)2 ,
and
∂V ar (θ)
∂b
=
∂
∂b
σ2η
a+ bρ2ωη + 1− ρ2ωη
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
= σ2η
− (−ρ2ηω + a+ 1)2(
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
)2 .
It is most convenient to characterize the set of feasible information structures by taking a
level of covariance as given and computing the set of feasible variance levels for the given
level of covariance.
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Thus, let
σησωρωη
a+ b+ 1− ρ2ωη
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
= C.
Note that for a = 0 or b = 0, the covariance is constant and equal to σησωρωη. Moreover, the
covariance is decreasing in a for given b and decreasing in b for given a. We have
lim
b→∞
a+ b+ 1− ρ2ωη
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
=
1
1 + a
,
and
lim
a→∞
a+ b+ 1− ρ2ωη
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
=
1
1 + b
.
So, letting both a and b (in whatever order) go to infinity results in a covariance of zero.
Hence, any C ∈ (0, σησωρωη] can be generated by finite a, b.
For a, b 6= 0, along a locus where the covariance is equal to C, we must have
σησωρωη
−b (−ρ2ηω + b+ 1)(
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
)2da+ σησωρωη −a
(−ρ2ηω + a+ 1)(
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
)2db = 0
so that
− b
(−ρ2ηω + b+ 1)
a
(−ρ2ηω + a+ 1)da = db,
and a and b are inversely related. Consider now how the variance changes along a locus
where the covariance is constant. Totally differentiating the variance, and substituting for
db as a function of da, we obtain
−b2ρ2ηωσ2η(
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
)2da+ σ2η −
(−ρ2ηω + a+ 1)2(
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
)2db
=
−b2ρ2ηωσ2η(
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
)2da− σ2η −
(−ρ2ηω + a+ 1)2(
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
)2 b
(−ρ2ηω + b+ 1)
a
(−ρ2ηω + a+ 1)da.
Note that
−b2ρ2ηω + b
(−ρ2ηω + b+ 1) (−ρ2ηω + a+ 1)a ≥ 0
since
−abρ2ηω +
(−ρ2ηω + b+ 1) (−ρ2ηω + a+ 1) > 0.
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Therefore, the variance is increasing in a and is thus minimal for the smallest possible value
of a that generates the desired covariance level and is highest for the highest possible value
of a that generates the covariance.
Consider first the smallest level of a. Since a and b are inversely related, this is the level
associated to b→∞.
lim
b→∞
σησωρωη
a+ b+ 1− ρ2ωη
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
= σησωρωη
1
1 + a
.
Note that any covariance smaller than σησωρωη can be generated this way. a is then deter-
mined by the condition
σησωρωη
1
1 + a
= C
and so
σησωρωη
C
− 1 = a.
Let V (C) denote the smallest possible value of the variance for a given level of C. Substi-
tuting σησωρωη
C
− 1 = a into the variance and taking the limit as b→∞, we obtain
V (C) = σ2η
ρ2ωη
σησωρωη
C
=
ση
σω
ρωηC.
Likewise, for b = σησωρωη
C
− 1 and taking the limit as a→∞ we obtain the highest value of
the variance
V (C) = σ2η
1
σησωρωη
C
=
ση
σω
1
ρωη
C.
It follows that a level of variance is feasible for a given level of C < σησωρωη if
V ∈
[
ση
σω
ρωηC,
ση
σω
1
ρωη
C
]
.
Consider now the case where C = σησωρωη. Since
a+ b+ 1− ρ2ωη
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
= 1
iff ab = 0, the level of covariance requires that either a = 0 or b = 0 or both. Hence, for
C = σησωρωη, we have for b = 0 and a ≥ 0
V ar (θ) = σ2η
a+ bρ2ωη + 1− ρ2ωη
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
= σ2η
41
and for a = 0 and b ≥ 0
V ar (θ) = σ2η
a+ bρ2ωη + 1− ρ2ωη
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
= σ2η
bρ2ωη + 1− ρ2ωη
1 + b− ρ2ωη
.
Since limb→∞
bρ2ωη+1−ρ2ωη
1+b−ρ2ωη = ρ
2
ωη, the expression σ
2
η
bρ2ωη+1−ρ2ωη
1+b−ρ2ωη ranges from ρ
2
ωησ
2
η to σ
2
η.
Proof of Theorem 1. The statement follows from solving Cov (ω, θ) = V ar (θ) for the
underlying noise structure. Recall that
Cov (ω, θ) = σησωρωη
a+ b+ 1− ρ2ωη
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
and
V ar (θ) = σ2η
a+ bρ2ωη + 1− ρ2ωη
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
,
where a ≡ σ2εω
σ2ω
and b ≡ σ
2
εη
σ2η
. Solving Cov (ω, θ) = V ar (θ) , we obtain
σω
ση
ρωη
(
a+ b+ 1− ρ2ωη
)
=
(
a+ bρ2ωη + 1− ρ2ωη
)
.
Rearranging, we have(
σω
ση
ρωη − ρ2ωη
)
b = a
(
1− σω
ση
ρωη
)
+
(
1− σω
ση
ρωη
)(
1− ρ2ωη
)
.
For σω
ση
∈
(
ρωη,
1
ρωη
]
we have σω
ση
− ρωη 6= 0, hence we can divide through by σωση ρωη − ρ2ωη and
obtain
b = a
(
1− σω
ση
ρωη
)
ρωη
(
σω
ση
− ρωη
) +
(
1− σω
ση
ρωη
)
ρωη
(
σω
ση
− ρωη
) (1− ρ2ωη) .
Consider next the case where σω
ση
− ρωη = 0. Note that
a
(
1− σω
ση
ρωη
)
+
(
1− σω
ση
ρωη
)(
1− ρ2ωη
)
> 0,
and that for finite b (
σω
ση
ρωη − ρ2ωη
)
b = 0.
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Hence, Cov (ω, θ) = V ar (θ) only if b is unbounded. Therefore, consider now the limiting
case
lim
b→∞
σ2η
a+ bρ2ωη + 1− ρ2ωη
(1 + a) (1 + b)− ρ2ωη
= σ2η
ρ2ωη
1 + a
.
For a = 0 and in the limit as b→∞
V ar (θ) = ρ2ωησ
2
η.
Likewise, for a = 0 and in the limit as b→∞
Cov (ω, θ) = σησωρωη.
Clearly, ρ2ωησ
2
η = σησωρωη for
σω
ση
= ρωη.
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove each part in sequence.
i) There is always an equilibrium inducing two distinct actions. Suppose there are just
two messages, up or down, and the Receiver chooses x = E [ω| θ ≥ θ0] if she hears up, and
x = E [ω| θ < θ0] if she hears down. For this to be an equilibrium, type θ0 needs to be
indifferent between the two actions, that is
θ0 − E [ω| θ < θ0] = E [ω| θ ≥ θ0]− θ0.
By symmetry of the distribution, this condition is always satisfied for θ0 = 0, since
−E [ω| θ < 0] = E [ω| θ ≥ 0] .
ii) We show that there is a class of equilibria within which there is no upper bound on
the number of induced actions. Since we want to characterize equilibria with the largest
number of induced actions, and there are such equilibria within the considered class, there
is no loss of generality in focusing on equilibria of that class for our purposes. It proves
convenient to relabel the indices on marginal types θi. Consider a symmetric equilibrium
with thresholds θ1, . . . , θn on the upper half and thresholds θ−1, . . . , θ−n, with θ−i = −θi for
all i. For n even we additionally have a threshold θ0 = 0. The indifference condition of types
θi for i = 2, . . . , n− 1 are given by
θi − E [ω| θ ∈ (θi−1, θi]] = E [ω| θ ∈ (θi, θi+1]]− θi, (10)
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while the last threshold satisfies
θn − E [ω| θ ∈ (θn−1, θn]] = E [ω| θ ≥ θn]− θn. (11)
We proceed as follows: in a first step we show by induction that dθi+1
dθi
≥ 1. Secondly, we
show that given a symmetric equilibrium with n threshold values, we can always construct
a symmetric equilibrium with n + 1 threshold values. Note that for existence it suffices
to consider the case where n is odd, and that because of symmetry we only consider the
threshold values above zero, the same reasoning holds for the mirror images, so that in total
we construct an equilibrium inducing 2 (n+ 1) actions.
Define
c ≡ Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
and
µ (θi−1, θi) ≡ E [θ| θ ∈ (θi−1, θi]] .
Totally differentiating the indifference condition of type θ1, i.e. θ1 = E [ω| θ ∈ (θ1, θ2]]− θ1,
we find that
dθ2
dθ1
=
2− cµθ1 (θ1, θ2)
cµθ2 (θ1, θ2)
.
By log-concavity of the distribution, we have µθ1 (θ1, θ2) ≤ 1 and µθ2 (θ1, θ2) ≤ 1, so for
c ≤ 1, we have dθ2
dθ1
> 0. Moreover, we also have dθ2
dθ1
> 1, since
2− cµθ1 (θ1, θ2)
cµθ2 (θ1, θ2)
> 1⇔ 2 > c (µθ1 (θ1, θ2) + µθ2 (θ1, θ2))
and the latter inequality is true because the sum in brackets is at most unity for log-concave
distributions.
Totally differentiating condition (10), we have
dθi+1
dθi
=
1− c
2
(
dθi−1
dθi
µθi−1 (θi−1, θi) + µθi (θi−1, θi) + µθi (θi, θi+1)
)
c
2
µθi+1 (θi, θi+1)
.
We now show the induction hypothesis dθi
dθi−1
≥ 1 implies that dθi+1
dθi
≥ 1. In fact, the latter is
equivalent to
1 ≥ c
2
(
dθi−1
dθi
µθi−1 (θi−1, θi) + µθi (θi−1, θi) + µθi (θi, θi+1) + µθi+1 (θi, θi+1)
)
.
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By the induction hypothesis and the log-concavity of the distribution, (which implies that
µθi−1 (θi−1, θi) + µθi (θi−1, θi) ≤ 1 and µθi (θi, θi+1) + µθi+1 (θi, θi+1) ≤ 1), it follows that the
inequality is satisfied for c ≤ 1.
We can construct an equilibrium with n + 1 threshold values (above zero), if we can
satisfy the following two conditions. Firstly, condition (10) must be satisfied for i = 2, . . . , n.
Secondly, θn+1 must satisfy condition (11), i.e.
θn+1 − E [ω| θ ∈ (θn, θn+1]] = E [ω| θ ≥ θn+1]− θn+1. (12)
Let θn1 denote the value of the first threshold θ1 that is consistent with the equilibrium in
n threshold values. (One can show that θn1 is unique.) Since the last threshold θ
n
n in this
equilibrium satisfies condition (11), it is impossible that there exists a threshold θn+1 < ∞
satisfying condition (12). We must therefore reduce θ1 below θ
n
1 .
Let θi (θ1) denote solutions to condition (10) as a function of the initial condition θ1. The
critical one among conditions (10) for the equilibrium with n+ 1 threshold values is
θn (θ1)− E [ω| θ ∈ (θn−1 (θ1) , θn (θ1)]] = E [ω| θ ∈ (θn (θ1) , θn+1 (θ1)]]− θn (θ1) . (13)
The sequence (θ1, . . . , θn (θ1)) is increasing in θ1. We can find a value θn+1 (θ1) that solves
(13) provided that θn−1 (θ1) , θn (θ1) are low enough and provided that
θn (θ1)− E [ω| θ ∈ (θn−1 (θ1) , θn (θ1)]] > lim
θn+1→θn(θ1)
E [ω| θ ∈ (θn (θ1) , θn+1]]− θn (θ1) (14)
and
θn (θ1)− E [ω| θ ∈ (θn−1 (θ1) , θn (θ1)]] < lim
θn+1→∞
E [ω| θ ∈ (θn (θ1) , θn+1]]− θn (θ1) . (15)
The former condition, (14) , can be written as
(2− c) θn (θ1) > cµ (θn−1 (θ1) , θn (θ1)) .
This condition is always satisfied for c ≤ 1. To see this, note that
(2− c) θn (θ1) ≥ θn (θ1) > µ (θn−1 (θ1) , θn (θ1)) ≥ cµ (θn−1 (θ1) , θn (θ1)) ,
where the critical inequality follows from the fact that θn (θ1) > θn−1 (θ1) .
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Consider the latter condition, (15) . The left-hand side is increasing in θ1. To see this,
note that
dθn (θ1)
dθ1
− c
(
µθn−1 (θn−1 (θ1) , θn (θ1))
dθn−1 (θ1)
dθ1
+ µθn (θn−1 (θ1) , θn (θ1))
dθn (θ1)
dθ1
)
=
dθn (θ1)
dθ1
(
1− c
(
µθn−1 (θn−1 (θ1) , θn (θ1))
dθn−1 (θ1)
dθn (θ1)
+ µθn (θn−1 (θ1) , θn (θ1))
))
≥ 0.
Thus, reducing θ1 below θ
n
1 reduces the value of the left-hand side. On the other hand, the
right-hand side
E [ω| θ ≥ θn (θ1)]− θn (θ1)
is decreasing in θn (θ1) since c ≤ 1 and E [θ| θ ≥ θn (θ1)]− θn (θ1) is decreasing in θn (θ1) due
to log-concavity. Thus, reducing θ1 below θ
n
1 increases the value of the right hand side of
(15) . It follows that for θ1 small enough, we can satisfy (13) .
It remains to be shown that θn+1 satisfies condition (12), i.e. that we can chose θ1 small
enough. Define
D ≡ θn+1 − E [ω| θ ∈ (θn (θ1) , θn+1]]− (E [ω| θ ≥ θn+1]− θn+1) ,
and note that D is increasing in θn+1 (due to log-concavity and c ≤ 1). Hence, we can find
θn+1 that sets D equal to zero if on the one hand
lim
θn+1→θn(θ1)
D < 0,
and on the other hand
lim
θn+1→∞
D > 0.
The latter condition does not constrain us in any way. Now consider the former. Rearranging,
we have
lim
θn+1→θn(θ1)
D = (1− c) θn (θ1)− (E [ω| θ ≥ θn (θ1)]− θn (θ1))
= (2− c) θn (θ1)− E [ω| θ ≥ θn (θ1)] .
So for the former condition we need to have
θn (θ1) <
c
2− cµ (θn (θ1) ,∞) .
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For θ1 small enough, this inequality is satisfied, since
c
2−c ∈ (0, 1] , θn (θ1) goes to zero as θ1
does, in which case the right-hand side remains bounded away from zero.
We conclude that we can set θ1 low enough to find a new equilibrium value θ
n+1
1 so that
for θ1 = θ
n+1
1 , a new equilibrium inducing 2 (n+ 1) actions is constructed. It follows that
there is no upper bound on n for c ≤ 1.
iii) For c ≥ 2, the maximum number of induced actions is two. From part i), we know that
there always exists an equilibrium with two distinct induced actions. Consider a candidate
equilibrium inducing three actions, the middle one being equal to zero. The indifference
condition for type θ1 is
1
2
E [ω| θ > θ1] = θ1.
Using E [ω| θ > θ1] = cE [θ| θ > θ1], we have
c
2
E [θ| θ > θ1] = θ1.
Since c
2
≥ 1 and E [θ| θ > θ1] > θ1 for any finite θ1, no solution can exist. Similarly, the
equilibrium condition for θ1 in any equilibrium with an odd number of induced actions and
n ≥ 5 is
θ1 =
c
2
E [θ| θ ∈ (θ1, θ2]] ,
so, by the same argument, there is no such solution.
The indifference condition for the first threshold in any equilibrium with an even number
of induced actions and n ≥ 4 for arbitrary θ2 is given by
θ1 − E [ω| θ ∈ (0, θ1]] = E [ω| θ ∈ (θ1, θ2]]− θ1.
For c ≥ 2 we immediately get the following contradiction
2θ1 = c (E [θ| θ ∈ (0, θ1]] + E [θ| θ ∈ (θ1, θ2]]) > c (0 + θ1) .
Hence there does not exist any θ1 and no equilibrium with n even and n ≥ 4.
Lemma 8 In a partitional equilibrium∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
∫
uR (x∗i − ω) f (ω| θ) dωf (θ) dθ
=
Cov (θ, ω)2
V ar (θ)2
(
V ar (θ)−
∑n
i=1
piV ar (θ |θ ∈ Θi )
)
− V ar (ω)
47
and ∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
∫
uR (x∗i − ω) f (ω| θ) dωf (θ) dθ
=
Cov (θ, ω)2
V ar (θ)2
(
V ar (θ)−
∑n
i=1
piV ar (θ |θ ∈ Θi )
)
− V ar (ω) .
Proof of Lemma 8. The Sender’s payoff is
∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
∫
uS (x∗i − η) f (η| θ) dηf (θ) dθ.
Expanding the square around E [ω| θ] , we can rewrite this as
−
∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
∫
(x∗i − E [ω| θ] + E [ω| θ]− η)2 f (η| θ) dηf (θ) dθ
= −
∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
∫ (
(x∗i − E [ω| θ])2 + 2 (x∗i − E [ω| θ]) (E [ω| θ]− η) + (E [ω| θ]− η)2
)
f (η| θ) dηf (θ) dθ
= −
∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
(x∗i − E [ω| θ])2 f (θ) dθ −
∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
2 (x∗i − E [ω| θ]) (E [ω| θ]− θ) f (θ) dθ
−
∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
∫
(E [ω| θ]− η)2 f (η| θ) dηf (θ) dθ
We now compute each term more explicitly, proceeding backwards. Term three can be
written as
−
∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
∫
(E [ω| θ]− η)2 f (η| θ) dηf (θ) dθ
= −
∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
∫ (
E [ω| θ]2 − 2θE [ω| θ] + η2) f (η| θ) dηf (θ) dθ
= −
(
Cov (ω, θ)2
V ar (θ)2
V ar (θ)− 2Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
V ar (θ) + V ar (η)
)
= −
(
Cov (ω, θ)2
V ar (θ)
− 2Cov (ω, θ) + V ar (η)
)
.
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Term two can be rewritten as
−
∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
2 (x∗i − E [ω| θ]) (E [ω| θ]− θ) f (θ) dθ
= −
∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
2
Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
(E [θ| θ ∈ [θi−1, θi]]− θ)
(
Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
− 1
)
θf (θ) dθ
= −2
(
Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
− 1
)
Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
∑n
i=1
pi
∫ θi
θi−1
(
E [θ| θ ∈ [θi−1, θi]] θ − θ2
) f (θ)
pi
dθ
= 2
(
Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
− 1
)
Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
∑n
i=1
piV ar (θ| θ ∈ [θi−1, θi])
+2
Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
(
Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
− 1
)∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
θ2f (θ) dθ
= 2
Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
(
Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
− 1
)(
V ar (θ)−
∑n
i=1
Pr (θ ∈ [θi−1, θi])E [θ| θ ∈ [θi−1, θi]]2
)
Finally, term one can be written as
−
∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
(x∗i − E [ω| θ])2 f (θ) dθ
= −
∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
Cov (ω, θ)2
V ar (θ)2
(E [θ| θ ∈ [θi−1, θi]]− θ)2 f (θ) dθ
= −Cov (ω, θ)
2
V ar (θ)2
∑n
i=1
piV ar (θ| θ ∈ [θi−1, θi]) .
Summing up, we can write
∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
∫
uS (x∗i − η) f (η| θ) dηf (θ) dθ
=
(
Cov (ω, θ)2
V ar (θ)2
− 2Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
)∑n
i=1
piV ar (θ| θ ∈ [θi−1, θi])
−
(
Cov (ω, θ)2
V ar (θ)
− 2Cov (ω, θ) + V ar (η)
)
.
Likewise, the Receiver’s expected utility,
∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
∫
uR (x∗i − ω) f (ω| θ) dωf (θ) dθ, takes
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the form
−
∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
∫
(x∗i − E [ω| θ] + E [ω| θ]− ω)2 f (ω| θ) dωf (θ) dθ
=−
∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
∫ (
(x∗i − E [ω| θ])2 + 2 (x∗i − E [ω| θ]) (E [ω| θ]− ω) + (E [ω| θ]− ω)2
)
f (ω| θ) dωf (θ) dθ
=−
∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
(x∗i − E [ω| θ])2 f (θ) dθ −
(
Cov (θ, ω)2
V ar (θ)2
V ar (θ)− 2Cov (θ, ω)
2
V ar (θ)
+ V ar (ω)
)
=−
∑n
i=1
∫ θi
θi−1
(x∗i − E [ω| θ])2 f (θ) dθ +
Cov (θ, ω)2
V ar (θ)2
V ar (θ)− V ar (ω)
= −Cov (ω, θ)
2
V ar (θ)2
∑n
i=1
piV ar (θ |θ ∈ Θi ) + Cov (θ, ω)
2
V ar (θ)2
V ar (θ)− V ar (ω) .
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof is split into two parts. The first part establishes the
Receiver’s preferences over information structures 1 and 2 described in the main text; the
second part adapts the analysis to the Sender’s problem.
The Receiver prefers information structure 2, since
V ar2 (θ)− V ar (ω)
=
Cov2 (θ, ω)
2
V ar2 (θ)
2 V ar2 (θ)− V ar (ω) =
Cov2 (θ, ω)
2
V ar1 (θ)
2 V ar1 (θ)− V ar (ω)
>
Cov1 (θ, ω)
2
V ar1 (θ)
2
(
V ar1 (θ)− Ip
∑n
i=1
piV ar1 (θ |θ ∈ Θi )
)
− V ar (ω) ,
where V ar1 (θ |θ ∈ Θi ) is the conditional variance (conditional on the truncated set Θi)
under information structure 1. The left-most expression is the Receiver’s expected utility in
the truthful and smooth equilibrium, which is feasible under structure 2. It follows that -
provided we can find (Cov2 (ω, θ) , V ar2 (θ)) satisfying V ar2 (θ) = V ar1 (θ) and Cov2 (ω, θ) =
V ar2 (θ) - that information structure (Cov1 (ω, θ) , V ar1 (θ)) is dominated. Note that under
Assumptions 1 and 2, an information structure 2 with the said properties indeed exists.
Consider now the Sender’s problem. The Sender’s expected payoff is(
2
Cov (ω, θ)
V ar (θ)
− Cov (ω, θ)
2
V ar (θ)2
)(
V ar (θ)− Ip
∑n
i=1
piV ar (θ |θ ∈ Θi )
)
− V ar (η) .
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Note that the term 2c− c2 is maximized at c = 1. Therefore,
V ar2 (θ)− V ar (η)
=
(
2
Cov2 (ω, θ)
V ar2 (θ)
− Cov2 (ω, θ)
2
V ar2 (θ)
2
)
V ar2 (θ)− V ar (η)
>
(
2
Cov1 (ω, θ)
V ar1 (θ)
− Cov1 (ω, θ)
2
V ar1 (θ)
2
)(
V ar1 (θ)−
∑n
i=1
piV ar (θ |θ ∈ Θi )
)
− V ar (η) .
The left-most expression is the equilibrium utility in the smooth and truthful equilibrium
under information structure 2; note that the truthful equilibrium is feasible under this struc-
ture. The right-hand side of the inequality is the equilibrium expected utility under the best
feasible equilibrium under information structure 1.
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